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No article on the right to privacy can begin without a recog-
nition of the famous article by Warren and Brandeis upon which
the "right to be let alone" is predicated.' From this article, either
through precedent or fiction, the right to privacy found substance
in the law of this country. Its bounds remained ill defined, and it
was soon to become the protector of numerous personal interests,
each in some vague way related to the privacy of individuals..2
Its adoption as a rule of law has been gradual, fragmentary, and
certainly not unanimous. It was rejected in New York in its first
judicial test in 1902.3 Three years later the Georgia Supreme
Court for the first time in this country recognized the right as
derived from the common law.4 Since then thirty-two states have
compensated invasions of privacy by judicial decree, and four
states have enacted legislation protecting certain aspects of in-
dividual privacy. 5 Only five states, including New York, have ex-
pressly refused to protect the privacy of its inhabitants as a matter
of common law. Nebraska is included in the latter five. In 1955
the Nebraska Supreme Court in Brunson v. Ranks Army Store,6
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' Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv. 193 (1890).
Judicial activists may claim that the article merely defined the interest
in need of protection which the common law evolved to protect, whereas
those courts committed to judicial self-restraint can find ample juristic
precedent in the article upon which to base the adoption of the doctrine.
The fact remains that whatever interest was being protected under
whatever label, the term "right to privacy" had its inception in this
article.
2 "It [right to privacy] became, in a sense, a catchall for a great number
of cases in which mental suffering or other emotional distress was the
primary injury sustained and for which no other substantive theory for
relief was available." 1 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS § 9.6 at 683-84 (1956).
3 Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442 (1902).
4 Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905).
5 See PROSSER, TORTS § 112 at 831-32 (3d ed. 1964).
6 161 Neb. 519, 73 N.W.2d 803 (1955).
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unceremoniously rejected the right to privacy in the following
manner:
The doctrine of the right of privacy was not recognized or enforced
in the ancient English common law.... Our research develops
no Nebraska case holding that this court has in any form or manner
adopted the doctrine of the right of privacy, and there is no prece-
dent in this state establishing the doctrine .... We submit that
if such a right is deemed necessary or desirable, such right should
be provided for by action of our Legislature and not by judicial
legislation on the part of our courts. This is especially true in
view of the nature of the right under discussion, under which right
not even the truth of the allegations is a defense.7
The court rejected the doctrine on two grounds: First, that neither
the common law of England nor of Nebraska has ever expressly
recognized the "right of privacy" and second, that in the absence of
such prior recognition the court is unwilling or unable to act.
Thus, in less than two hundred words the privacy of individu-
als was laid bare, without protection. And this resulted not from
a finding of lack of need, but because of a self-proclaimed judicial
inadequacy to so provide. That the court would take such an ap-
proach to this problem strikes hard at the fundamental precepts
of the common law. If this approach is logically extended, the
development of the common law in Nebraska will have been rele-
gated to a mechanical search through the 'musty pages of the Ne-
braska Reports and the English Year Books for some oblique refer-
ence to magic language, i.e. "right to privacy."
It is suggested that the traditional method of judicial decision-
making has been through analysis of the relative merits of the
respective interests of the parties. This has particular impact in
the privacy area once it is recognized that the right to privacy
merely describes an aggregation of personal interests, which have
already received varying degrees of protection in Nebraska prior
to the Brunson case. The major part of this article will be de-
voted to illustrating the similarities between- the interests -thus
protected and those constituting the, right to. privacy.
Other developments since 1955 also tend to indicate that the
Brunson case is ripe for review. The impact of scholastic commen-
tary did not cease in 1890 with'Warren and Brandeis- and several
attempts have since been made to categorizeand thus clarify the
nature of the interests protected. Judicial'activity, in those states
recognizing the right to privacy has wrestled With and solved
many of the problems inherent in such an area. Although privacy
protection has not been expanded to its outermost limits, the direc-
7 Id. at 525, 73 N.W.2d at 806.
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tion and scope of the tort are now fairly well defined. Thus, the
Nebraska court would not now be called upon to adopt a totally
untested doctrine. One must also note that since 1955 the United
States Supreme Court has found constitutional foundations for
privacy protection.
The most significant change since 1955 for purposes of the de-
velopment of the common law in Nebraska, and specifically the
right to privacy, has been a notable departure from the philosophy
of judicial self-restraint on the part of the Nebraska court. There
is a noticeable movement within the court to recognize stare decisis
as a guiding principle rather than an inflexible command. This
change in attitude certainly casts doubt on the importance of the
Brunson case as precedent and gives some indication that the court
should again be called upon to give protection to those interests
comprising the right to privacy.
II. THE SEARCH FOR MAGIC LANGUAGE
It is true, as the Nebraska Supreme Court points out in Brun-
son, that no case in Nebraska has expressly imposed liability on a
defendant under the doctrine of right to privacy. It is not true
that the Nebraska Supreme Court has never recognized the doc-
trine as such. If the court today would still insist on being pre-
sented language from prior decisions recognizing the right, such
decisions are available. These past references to privacy doctrine
can only be considered dicta, and admittedly not very conclu-
sive dicta, but they do indicate that the interest sought to be pro-
tected has received some judicial recognition.
Three Nebraska cases dealing with the elements of damage in
eminent domain cases include language from the following quota-
tion from American Jurisprudence:
The creation of noise and dust, the invasion of privacy, the depriva-
tion of light ... and like matters, are to be included, not by being
added together item by item, but to the extent that, taken as a
whole, they detract from the market value of the property.8
The following factors limit the relevance of the above quotation
to the establishment of the tort of.invasion of the right to privacy:
(1) there has not been a case in Nebraska where the privacy item
of damage was directly. at issue, (2) the compensation suggested
was not for invasion of privacy per se but only as it affected the
8 Balog v. State, 177 Neb. 826, 834, 131 N.W.2d 402, 408 (1964); Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. City of Omaha, 171 Neb. 457, 476, 106 N.W.2d 727, 739(1960); Crawford v. Central Neb. Pub. Power & Irr. Dist., 154 Neb. 832,
836, 49 N.W.2d 682, 686 (1951). (Emphasis added.)
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market value of the property, and (3) eminent domain involves
invasions by governmental authorities and not by private indi-
viduals. There is, however, within the quotation a recognition that
the individual's interest in privacy has some legal ramifications. 9
A more direct reference to the doctrine of right to privacy can
be found in the older Nebraska case law. Warren and Brandeis
based part of their article on the English case of Pollard v. Photo-
graphic Co.,' 0 where an injunction was issued restraining the unau-
thorized use of the plaintiff's photograph. In 1906, in State v. State
Journal Co.," the Pollard case was argued to support a common
law copyright. In distinguishing the Pollard case, the Nebraska
Supreme Court commented:
The photograph in [Pollard] was a private matter, it never had
been published, and the attempt to publish it on the part of the
defendant was the injury complained of. The case [Pollard] illus-
trates the doctrine of the right of privacy. This right of the plain-
tiff to prevent her photograph being made public against her wish
was so well established in English law that it was unnecessary to
discuss that right.12
Thus, the Nebraska court has expressly recognized, if not adopted,
the doctrine of right to privacy.
This approach should still not be conclusive, however. The
court has not yet analyzed the interests sought to be protected,
and off-hand references to the right of privacy are certainly no
substitute for a full-fledged discussion of the issue.
9 Tracing the original use of privacy terminology in these eminent
domain cases provides an excellent example of how the law develops.
The first reference to privacy in such cases was in 1895 in Comstock
v. Clearfield & M. Ry. Co., 169 Pa. St. 582, 32 Atl. 431 (1895), which
allowed the jury to consider the diminution of property value because
of a railroad which ran next to the plaintiff's residence, shaking his
house. The Comstock case was cited with approval in Shano v. Fifth
Ave. & H. St. Bridge Co., 189 Pa. 245, 42 Atl. 128 (1899), which directly
held that invasion of privacy was one of the elements of damage. The
Shano decision was reported in 10 R.C.L., Eminent Domain § 152 (1929)
and subsequently the rule was included in 18 Am. Jm., Eminent Do-
main § 282 (1938). The three Nebraska cases cited in footnote 8, supra,
picked up the quotation from American Jurisprudence. The second
series of American Jurisprudence uses the quotation as a rule of law
and cites to two of the three Nebraska cases. 27 Am. Jum. 2d, Eminent
Domain § 327 (1966). Thus the quotation has become a clear rule of
law although only one court, back in 1899, actually provides a direct
holding to that effect.
10 40 Ch. Div. 345 (1888).
11 77 Neb. 752, 110 N.W. 763 (1906).
12 Id. at 758, 110 N.W. at 765-66. (Emphasis added.)
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III. THE CHANGE IN JUDICIAL PHILOSOPHY
In the Brunson case, the Nebraska Supreme Court rejects the
philosophy that the common law is a growing body of law con-
stantly adapting to meet changing circumstances. 13 Instead the
court relies on a strict application of stare decisis.
This is not the place for a lengthy discussion of the principles
behind stare decisis or the advantages and disadvantages of ad-
hering to precedent. 14 It would seem, however, that a respect for
the past would include not only respect for past decisions on sub-
stantive law but also past pronouncements of judicial policy. In
this light it should be noted that the Nebraska court stated ten
years before the Brunson case:
One of its [the common law's] oldest maxims was that where the
reason of a rule ceased, the rule ceased, and it logically followed
that when it occurred to the courts that a particular rule had
never been founded upon reason, and that no reason existed in
support thereof, that rule likewise ceased, and perhaps another
sprang up in its place which was based upon reason and justice as
then conceived.'5
The development of the right to privacy and its subsequent pro-
tection by the common law did not come about during the twenti-
eth century by mere coincidence. Nor was it absent in centuries
past because of judicial reluctance. Although the same interests
were present, the importance of their protection and the ability to
13 Of the innumerable quotations available for the above proposition the
following three must be mentioned: "Our system is founded on pre-
cedent and respect for authorities. But this just and necessary respect,
if not informed by a due measure of intelligent criticism, tends to
degenerate into mechanical slavery." POLLOCK, THE GENIus OF
COMMON LAw 113-14 (1912).
"[W]hen the law has left the situation uncovered by any pre-
existing rule, there is nothing to do except to have some impartial
arbiter declare what fair and reasonable men, mindful of the habits of
life of the community, and of the standards of justice and fair dealing
prevalent among them, ought in such circumstances to do, with no
rules except those of custom and conscience to regulate their conduct."
CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 142-43 (1922).
"The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience.
The felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political the-
ories, intuitions of public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the prej-
udices which judges share with their fellow-men, have had a good deal
more to do than the syllogism in determining the rules by which men
should be governed." HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881).
14 See Hart & Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the Making
and Application of Law 587-88 (1958) (mimeograph).
'5 State ex rel. Johnson v. Tautges, Rerat & Welch, 146 Neb. 439, 444, 20
N.W.2d 232, 234 (1945). (Emphasis added.)
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invade them were minimal. In early English history an individual
was much more in need of protection for his body than for his
intangible personality.16 Moreover, the environment was not yet
such as to breed invasions or intrusions.17 . If one had a strong
lock on his door and shutters on his windows most intrusions could
be thwarted. It takes little imagination to discern why in the
twentieth century the courts adapted the common law to protect
the right to privacy.' 8 Some have given as reasons the rise of
yellow journalism and commercial advertising. 9 This is undoubt-
edly what inspired the creation of Warren and Brandeis' article.
It has also been said that
the inception of the doctrine was the almost inevitable development
of the law under the pressure of great social need, produced by
the technological developments and the vast extension of business
which transformed American society into mass urbanization thus
creating many new sensitivities.20
At the very least the right to privacy is a "product of its time."'21
As a constitutional principle also, privacy is an idea whose
time has come. In Mapp v. Ohio,22 the United States Supreme
Court viewed the fourth amendment as creating a "right to pri-
vacy, no less important than any other right carefully and particu-
10 Life in England in the 14th century was described as follows: "The
woods were full of outlaws who robbed all who came their way, and
even, on occasion, seized the King's judges and held them for ransom.
Some were even bold enough to force their way into the law courts
and overawe the justices." CRoss, A SHORTER HISTORY or ENGLAND AND
GRAT Brrm 142 (3d ed. 1939). -
17 During the 17th century London had a population of around half a
million but there were only four towns- with more than ten thousand
inhabitants. On top of that the newspapers were in their embryonic
stages, and the major news circulation was carried on by coffee houses
and newsletters. Id. at 409-12. With these conditions it would seem
unlikely that invasions of privacy would be-serious or frequent enough
to warrant protection at common law.
18 "The early Americans were so secure in their sense of privacy that
they seldom gave it a thought-the Constitution does not contain the
term. If anything, most felt they had more privacy than they needed
in their scattered farms, and made up for it by frequent gatherings
at taverns and hostels, where their gregariousness shocked visiting
Europeans. Today, just when the affluent society should be on the
verge of providing every American with as much or as little privacy
as he chooses, there is more justified alarm over the state of privacy
than at any time in U.S. history." Time, July 15, 1966, p. 38.
19 HALE, Tim LAW OF THE PREss, 299' (3d ed. 1948).
20 1 HARPER & JAmEs, ToRTs § 9.6 at 683 (1956)2
21 Nizer, The Right of Privacy, 39 MicH. L. REV. 526 (1941).
22 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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larly reserved to the people.12 3  And Griswold v. Connecticut,24
which struck down the Connecticut anti-birth control legislation,
draws a right to privacy from a penumbra of constitutional provi-
sions. This article is confined to the common law doctrine pro-
hibiting invasions by private individuals but as the New York Su-
preme Court noted:
The concept of a right of privacy as a constitutional right safe-
guarding the individual against unreasonable governmental action
must be distinguished from the individual's private law right of
privacy against infringement by another individual. Nevertheless,
it cannot be doubted that the stature and scope of the private law
right have been greatly enhanced by the recent development of its
constitutional law counterpart.2 5
Yet, in Nebraska, the Brunson decision remains as an obstacle
to privacy protection. The court has not since been called upon
to reject that decision. However, the court has dramatically re-
jected the philosophy underlying that decision. In Myers v. Droz-
da,26 a 1966 Nebraska case, the court held that charities were no
longer immune from tort liability. In doing so it overruled a long
line of cases, the latest being decided the same year as Brunson.27
The court in Myers said:
Stare decisis "was intended, not to effect a 'petrifying rigidity,'
but to assure the justice that flows from certainty and stability.
... [W] e would be abdicating 'our own function, in a field pe-
culiarly nonstatutory,' were we to insist on legislation and 'refuse
to reconsider an old and unsatisfactory court-made rule.'28
With this statement and the actual holding of the court in Myers,
the underpinnings of the Brunson decision can no longer be consid-
ered conclusive. The Myers case heralds the opportunity for a
re-examination of the right to privacy and its applicability to
Nebraska.
A comparison of the facets of the Myers approach with those
of Brunson indicates how far the court has gone in reversing its
past attitude toward the common law. It also underlines the
demise of the Brunson case as precedent against the establishment
of the right to privacy.
23 Id. at 656.
24 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
25 Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc., 43 Misc. 2d 219, 223, 250 N.Y.S.2d 529,
534 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
26 180 Neb. 183, 141 N.W.2d 852 (1966).
27 Muller v. Nebraska Methodist Hosp., 160 Neb. 279, 70 N.W.2d 86 (1955).
28 Myers v. Drozda, 180 Neb. 183, 186, 141 N.W.2d 852, 854 (1966), citing
Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656, 667, 143 N.E.2d 3, 9 (1957).
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A. OVEMULING vs. NoNRicoGNxmoN
In Myers, the court was forced to overrule a long line of prece-
dent expressly exempting charities from tort liability. The last
case granting immunity, Muller v. Nebraska Methodist Hosp.,29
was not a mechanical application of earlier precedent. The opin-
ion was a thorough analysis of the existing law and social policy,
and determined that charitable immunity still had a logical basis
in fact and policy. Whatever one might think of the result, the
fact remains that it was a reasoned opinion on the merits. The
court in Myers was thus forced to find that the conditions had
changed so as not to warrant immunity for charitable institutions.
It had to directly overrule the Muller decision.
In Brunson the court did not have to overrule any prior deci-
sion. It was asked to analyze the merits of the conflicting inter-
ests. This it did not do. It would seem that the impact of stare
decisis would be considerably stronger where there are contrary
decisions than where there are no prior precedents, either for or
against.
An examination of the effect of these decisions is also relevant.
In Myers, if the court had decided to retain charitable immunity by
adopting the Brunson philosophy of rigid adherence to precedent,
the law of charitable immunity would have still found its basis in
rational analysis, i.e. the reasoning of the court in Muller. The
court failed to realize in Brunson, that in claiming an inadequacy
to decide the question presented, they in fact did decide the issue-
decided it against privacy protection. Thus, at present the law of
privacy in Nebraska has never been thoroughly discussed or an-
alyzed-yet it has been rejected.
Hope remains for a judicial re-examination of the question.
Any subsequent attack on the Brunson case need not hurdle an
adverse decision on the merits, but only an adverse judicial phi-
losophy-a philosophy that the Nebraska court has already re-
jected.30
29 160 Neb. 279, 70 N.W.2d 86 (1955).
30 Another case of some interest here is Schmieding v. American Farmers
Mutual Ins. Co., 138 F. Supp. 167 (D. Neb. 1955), which was decided
after the Muller decision but before Brunson. Judge Delehant noted
that the right to privacy had not been ruled on in Nebraska and then
held: "This court is of the opinion that if and when the issue is pre-
sented to that [Nebraska] court it will not recognize the existence of
a right of privacy whose violation shall give rise to a civil liability in
the absence of a then controlling statute. That court has been disposed
to leave to legislative action the creation of new, or the alteration of
existing, bases of civil actions. Muller v. Nebraska Methodist Hospital
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B. COURTS IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS
The Muller case, which was overruled by Myers, relied heavily
on case law from other jurisdictions in forming the basis of chari-
table immunity. Likewise, in Myers, the court noted since Mul-
ler, other states had overruled immunity decisions. The judicial
trend was "unmistakable." 1
In Brunson, the court did not rely on a count of jurisdictions.
In support of their position the court cites four cases which re-
jected privacy protection as a matter of common law. These four
cases represent but three jurisdictions. Totally ignored were the
twenty odd jurisdictions which by that time had recognized the
right to privacy under common law principles. It might be said
that in privacy, as in charitable immunity, the judicial trend was
unmistakable. Of course a head count of jurisdictions is not con-
clusive in deciding questions of law. However, the split in juris-
dictions especially where those opposed to the Nebraska position
were in the large majority, suggests that the issue was not as
easily disposed of as the court indicated in Brunson.
C. THE NEBRASKA CONSTITUTION
The court uses as an important foundation to its decision in
Brunson, a Nebraska statute which provides:
So much of the common law of England as is applicable and not
inconsistent with the Constitution of the United States, with the
organic law of this state, or with any law passed or to be passed
by the Legislature of this state, is adopted and declared to be law
within the State of Nebraska.3 2
It is puzzling how this statute could be interpreted to preclude the
development of common law doctrine not expressly found in the
English law. The statute was obviously passed to insure a founda-
tion for Nebraska law, not a restriction on its development. It
could be argued also that to interpret the statute as a restriction
would make it contrary to Article I, Section 13 of the Constitution
of the State of Nebraska which reads: "All courts shall be open,
and every person, for any injury done him in his lands, goods, per-
son or reputation, shall have a remedy by due course of law, and
justice administered without denial or delay." The exact interpre-
tation of this constitutional provision is not free from doubt. In
.... " Id. at 183. Judge Delehant's prophecy was obviously correct,
but was based on the philosophy of Muller which has been subsequently
rejected in Myers.
31 Myers v. Drozda, 180 Neb. 183, 186, 141 N.W.2d 852, 854 (1966).
32 NEB. REV. STAT. § 49-101 (Reissue 1960).
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the Muller case, the court held that the provision "does not create
any new rights but is merely a declaration of a general funda-
mental principle."33 Such an interpretation can be readily accepted
were it not for its citation in the Myers decision. In Myers, the
defendant argued that a change in the charitable immunity doc-
trine should be made only by the legislature. The court in reject-
ing that argument stated: "If we endorsed legislation by silence,
[in Muller] we erred. See Art. I, § 13, Constitution of Nebraska
.... "34 The use of the citation is far from clear, especially in
light of the decision in Muller that the provision did not create
any new right. The most justified conclusion would be that al-
though the constitutional provision does not create new rights, it
does indeed give the court power to so create them or to modify or
expand them. This interpretation would raise serious doubts on
the validity of the Brunson philosophy.
D. "FIELD PECULIARLY NONSTATUTORY"
Using a New York case for authority the court in Myers indi-
cates that the field of charitable immunity or liability is of a
peculiarly nonstatutory nature. It is interesting to trace the ori-
gin of that language. The Nebraska court quoted it from Bing v.
Thunig,35 a New York case dealing with charitable immunity. But
the court in Bing acquired the language from another New York
case, Woods v. Lancet.36 The Woods case involved the question of
whether New York would recognize tort liability for injury in-
flicted upon an unborn fetus. One prior decision had refused to
recognize liability.37 The Woods case overruled the adverse prece-
dent and created a cause of action for such injuries. The Woods
doctrine is not unlike establishing the right to privacy. Neither
had been recognized either in the common law of the state or in
English law. The "field" which was termed "peculiarly nonstatu-
tory" involved the creation of tort liability where it had not ex-
isted before.
E. THE NATUr OF THE RULE ANNOUNCED
In Myers, the court not only repudiated charitable immunity,
but held that causes of action arising before the date of the filing
33 Muller v. Nebraska Methodist Hosp., 160 Neb. 279, 288, 70 N.W.2d 86, 91
(1955).
34 Myers v. Drozda, 180 Neb. 183, 186, 141 N.W.2d 852, 854 (1966).
35 2 N.Y.2d 656, 667, 143 N.E.2d 3, 9 (1957).
36 303 N.Y. 349, 355, 102 N.E.2d 691, 694 (1951).
s7 Drobner v. Peters, 232 N.Y. 220, 133 N.E. 567 (1921).
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of the court's opinion, would be valid only to the extent of the
charity's liability insurance coverage. The significance attributed
to insurance coverage runs contrary to the court's known position
on the relevance of insurance in personal injury law suits.,
One would like to comment that the Myers rule is more sus-
ceptible to a charge of judicial legislation than the adoption of the
principle of right to privacy. But to one who seriously questions
the importance of the "judicial legislation" concept, it is difficult
to express such a comparison. One certainly has the feeling that
the Myers decision comes closer to a legislative type pronounce-
ment. However, if it is considered the duty of judicial bodies to
develop the law, particularly in the private law area and to con-
sider all of the underlying social policies and ramifications, then
the result in Myers does not come as any radical judicial action
unless it is compared to the "reasoning" in the Brunson case.
IV. INTEREST ANALYSIS UNDER NEBRASKA LAW
The development of no other area of law owes as much to the
law reviews as does the right to privacy. Its inception resulted
from the Warren and Brandeis article. But, as important, its clar-
ification has come about, its boundaries established, and its fringes
explored as much by writers as by judges. It was soon discovered
that the "right to privacy" concept embraced several distinct inter-
ests, and several authors have attempted to define and separate
these interests and thereby facilitate the development of the case
law. Everyone seems to agree that all of the interests included
have something to do with the intangible personality of the in-
dividual. Four separate interests have been suggested as the most
important: (1) the interest in seclusion, (2) the interest in per-
sonal dignity and self-respect, (3) the interest in privacy of name,
likeness, and life history, and (4) the interest in sentimental as-
sociations.39 One author proposed dividing the tort itself into
three classifications: (1) intrusion, (2) disclosure of private facts,
and (3) appropriation of name or likeness.40 This process of delin-
eation has thus far culminated in the work of Dean Prosser who
classifies the right to privacy into four separate torts: (1) intru-
38 See Fielding v. Publix Cars, Inc., 130 Neb. 576, 265 N.W. 726 (1936);
Bergendahl v. Rabeler, 131 Neb. 538, 268 N.W. 459 (1936).
39 Harper & McNeely, A Re-examination of the Basis for Liability for
Emotional Distress [1938] Wis. L. REV. 426. See also Green, The Right
of Privacy, 27 ILL. L. REv. 237 (1932) where the author lists seven as-
pects of personality protected.
40 Dickler, The Right of Privacy, A Proposed Redefinition, 70 U.S. L. Rrv.
435 (1936).
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sion upon plaintiff's physical and mental solitude and seclusion,
(2) public disclosure of private facts about plaintiff, (3) placing
plaintiff in a false light in the public eye, and (4) appropriation of
plaintiff's name or likeness for defendant's benefit.41 Prosser's
classification is of particular importance in light of its judicial
adoption by several recent cases which may in turn signal the be-
ginning of wide-spread judicial acceptance.42
There is one drawback to this process of classification which
should be mentioned. Segregating the tort of right to privacy into
four separate torts as Prosser has done should not eliminate the
necessity for evaluating interests which may not neatly fit the four
tort blueprint. If these four torts are now considered conclusive
of the interests needing protection, and additional interests are left
unprotected merely because they have not yet been included then
the common law will have again returned to the philosophy rep-
resented by Brunson.
The remainder of this article will discuss the four torts named
by Prosser. It should be remembered that they are attempts to
define interests and the scope of their protection. It is suggested
that the four interests thus defined have received at least limited
protection in Nebraska without using privacy terminology, and thus
the adoption of privacy principles will not be a radical departure
from precedent.43  Adoption of the right to privacy would on the
other hand clarify the interests and insure complete rather than
fragmentary protection.
41 Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383 (1960); PROSSER, TORTS § 112 (3d
ed. 1964).
42 See, e.g., Fowler v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 343 F.2d 150 (5th
Cir. 1965); Hamberger v. Eastman, 106 N.H. 107, 206 A.2d 239 (1964);
Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc., 43 Misc. 2d 219, 250 N.Y.S.2d 529 (Sup.
Ct. 1964); LeCrone v. Ohio Bell Tel. Co., 120 Ohio App. 129, 201 N.E.2d
533 (1963).
43 "Examination of the cases leads me to the conclusion that for some 200
or more years relief has been given against certain invasions of one's
right of privacy. It is matter of small moment that the juristic mind,
cautious and conservative, ever groping for precedent in granting relief,
based its reason on some then recognized legal ground, no matter how
far-fetched the fiction might be on which it was supported. Hence
cases may be grouped into those which found in it some property right
Others bolstered up their jurisdiction on the fiction of 'breach
of trust'.. . . Still others were able to grant relief at law under fact,
or fiction, of 'breach of contract.' Stripped of all legal fiction, it was
essentially right of privacy which was being protected. Called by any
other name, it proved just as sacred. Why the necessity for so much
artifice?" Graham v. Baltimore Post Co., reported in 22 Ky. L.J. 108,
120 (1933).
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A. INTRUSION
The tort of intrusion is designed to protect the physical and
mental solitude and seclusion of the plaintiff. The requirements
for the tort are: (1) there is an intrusion, (2) the intrusion is ob-
jectionable and offensive to a reasonable man, and (3) that in-
truded upon is entitled to privacy.44 Publicity is not required.4 5
The advance of electronics and technology alone provides adequate
reason for the protection of these interests, especially since elec-
tronic devices are becoming more readily accessible to the general
public.46 A cursory glance at a few of the cases already decided
in this area point up the need for protection of this interest. Two
cases involved a landlord who "bugged" his tenants' rooms and
listened to their personal conversations. 47 Photography also of-
44 PROSSER, TORTS § 112 at 833-34 (3d ed. 1964). See also Dickler, supra
note 40 at 438 where the author described the interest as follows: "An
Englishman's home is his castle; he should be able to pursue a secluded
existence free from prying eyes and curious ears." Harper and James
suggest that there are two aspects of seclusion, the interest in not
being seen or heard and the interest in not seeing or hearing others.
1 HARPER & JAMES, op. cit. supra note 2 at 681.
45 Hamberger v. Eastman, 106 N.H. 107, 206 A.2d 239 (1964).
46 Vance Packard claims that "in the course of a year literally millions
of Americans are watched or overheard electronically without their
awareness at some time during any single week." The author also
comments that a "Be a Spy" kit with instructions in bugging was ad-
vertised in a leading electronics magazine for $22.50. Microphones can
bring in conversations from 500 feet in ideal conditions. There is also
the publicized case of the United States military attache in Moscow
who discovered that the olive in his martini was actually a transmitter
and the toothpick an antenna. PACKARD, THE NAKED SocriTY 30-37
(1964). See also, DASH, THE EAVESDROPPERS 336 (1959) where prices of
microphones are listed costing as low as $1.50. Also, a parabolic set
which would extend a microphone's hearing distance over five times
its normal range can be built for around $50 using military surplus
parts. Id. at 351. See also a discussion on infra-red cameras capable
of taking pictures in near darkness without the subject being alerted.
Id. at 373-74. Senator Edward Long recently noted that one private
detective agency provides a "ten day blitz service" which amounts to
a "do-it-yourself system for seeing and hearing what is happening
around the house while you are away." It consists of a telephone bug,
a hidden movie camera, and a microphone for the family car. The
rental charge for the outfit is around $400. Long, We Must Control
Private Eyes, Parade, Oct. 30, 1966, p. 6.
47 Hamberger v. Eastman, 106 N.H. 107, 206 A.2d 239 (1964); Roach v.
Harper, 143 W. Va. 869, 105 S.E.2d 564 (1958). In the latter case the
court said: "[T]he right to privacy is an individual right that should
be held inviolate. To hold otherwise, under modern means of com-
munication, hearing devices, photography, and other technological ad-
vancements, would effectively deny valuable rights and freedoms to
the individual." Id. at 876, 105 S.E.2d at 568. For other electronic in-
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fers a fertile means for invasion of privacy. Probably the most
shocking case denying plaintiff relief on privacy grounds occurred
in Wisconsin where a tavern owner had a hobby of taking pictures
of his feminine patrons while they were in the rest room of his
establishment and then passing the pictures around for his other
guests' entertainment. The Wisconsin Supreme Court refused to
recognize the doctrine of right to privacy on grounds similar to
those of the Nebraska court.48  Intrusions into the physical and
mental seclusion of others may take many forms. Richard Nixon
relied on the right to privacy to keep his name off the presidential
ballot in Florida.49 A number of cases have arisen through the
overzealous actions of creditors attempting to collect a debt.50
The true interest protected under the tort law of intrusion is
a mental interest and the similarity between this and the tort of
intentional infliction of mental distress can hardly go unnoticed.
Most writers can draw only minor distinctions between the two.51
An examination of the Nebraska cases illustrates that, although not
expressing the results on the basis of right to privacy, the court
has recognized the interest and protected it far beyond the bounds
required by the tort of intentional infliction of mental distress.
trusions see McDaniel v. Atlanta Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 60 Ga. App.
92, 2 S.E.2d 810 (1939) (receiving set in plaintiff's hospital room);
Rhodes v. Graham, 238 Ky. 225, 37 S.W.2d 46 (1931) (telephone tap).
Nebraska makes tapping of telephone or telegraph lines a criminal
offense. NEB. RE V. STAT. § 86-328 (Reissue 1958).
48 Yoeckel v. Samonig, 272 Wis. 430, 75 N.W.2d 925 (1956). For another
recent case of photographic intrusion on the feminine modesty see
Daily Times Democrat v. Graham, 276 Ala. 380, 162 So. 2d 474 (1964).
In that case the plaintiff while leaving a fun house passed over air jets
which blew her skirt up exposing her "from the waist down, with the
exception of that portion covered by her 'panties.'" Id. at 381, 162 So.
2d at 476. At that moment the defendant took her picture and pub-
lished it on the front page of his newspaper with 5,000 circulation. The
Alabama court in a flair of southern chivalry affirmed a jury verdict
of $4,166 for invasion of privacy. See also, Barber v. Time, Inc., 348
Mo. 1199, 159 S.W.2d 291 (1942) (picture of plaintiff in hospital bed).
49 Battaglia v. Adams, 164 So. 2d 195 (Fla. 1964).
50 Biederman's of Springfield, Inc. v. Wright, 322 S.W.2d 892 (Mo. 1959)
(unreasonable and oppressive methods to collect a debt); Housh v.
Peth, 165 Ohio St. 35, 133 N.E.2d 340 (1956).
51 Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALl. L. REv. 383, 422 (1960) (privacy does not
require as extreme an intrusion); Ezer, Intrusion on Solitude: Herein
of Civil Rights and Civil Wrongs, 21 LAw ix TRArsrrioN 63, 70 (1961):
"In a mental distress case -. . -recovery of substantial damages is un-
likely because the plaintiff must demonstrate... trauma, neuroses or
the like, and sometimes a physical manifestation of the injury as well.
Intrusion on the other hand allows recovery of sizeable monetary
awards after mere injured feelings, humiliation, or embarrassment are
shown."
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In Kurpgeweit v. Kirby,52 the defendant, by falsely claiming that a
Mrs. Stubbert was ill and required assistance, induced the plaintiff,
a young married woman, to come with him in his wagon. As the
defendant drove past Mrs. Stubbert's house, the plaintiff, realizing
the deceit, jumped from the wagon and ran into Mrs. Stubbert's
house. The defendant subsequently entered the house and used
language implying plaintiff was a lewd woman. Plaintiff became
agitated and feared neighborhood gossip. She sought damages for
her mental distress, nervousness and damaged reputation suffered
by the acts of the defendant. The case was tried as an assault
rather than as a defamation action and resulted in a plaintiff's
verdict for 3,000 dollars. There was no evidence of any direct or
indirect physical injury. On appeal the Nebraska Supreme Court
rejected defendant's contention that damages were not allowable
for mental pain and suffering in the absence of physical injury
and said:
We consider the peculiar circumstances of this case to place it with-
in the reason of another class of cases, where by an active and wilful
or wanton act one has been injured in his personal rights and privi-
leges, has been deprived of his liberty, or damaged in reputation,
or outraged and humiliated in his personal self-respect or in the
finer sentiments of his nature. 53
This is nothing more nor less than protection of the plaintiff's
right to privacy. It is true that the court felt obligated to find
some other basis upon which to rest liability and thus held that
the action was based on
an action for a trespass upon the person of plaintiff, a direct inva-
sion of her personal rights, and the accompanying circumstances
of mental suffering, humiliation, and injury to her social standing
and reputation in the neighborhood constituted matter in aggrava-
tion.54
The trespass found in this case was the defendant's putting his
hand on the plaintiff's arm during the wagon ride. Although this
case was based on a trespass theory it was nothing more than an
intrusion, and the interest protected was the mental and physical
seclusion and solitude of the plaintiff.
In Bush v. Mockett,55 plaintiff, being angry at her neighbor,
built an unsightly fence between their two lots. The defendant
tore it down; plaintiff rebuilt it and sued to enjoin the defendant
from interfering again. Defendant sought an injunction to stop
52 88 Neb. 72, 129 N.W. 177 (1910).
53 Id. at 76, 129 N.W. at 179. (Emphasis added.)
54 Id. at 78, 129 N.W. at 180.
55 95 Neb. 552, 145 N.W. 1001 (1914).
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plaintiff from maintaining the fence alleging that it was built "for
the express purpose of harassing defendants and their family, and
for the purpose of annoying them and disturbing their peace of
mind, and for the purpose of decreasing the value of their said
property ..... " The Nebraska Supreme Court held that plaintiff's
fence was built solely to annoy and punish the defendants and that
the fence affected the defendant's property to the extent of 500
dollars. In granting defendant's injunction the court held:
Courts of equity would fail in the service that history shows they
were intended to render to society if they are unable to protect
those common rights which more clearly appear, and become more
valuable, as civilization advances and the relations of social life
become more intricate and more enjoyable.56
Although again the right to privacy was not the expressed basis
for granting relief, the interest protected was the interest of se-
clusion.
In LaSalle Extension Univ. v. Fogarty,57 the plaintiff sued de-
fendant on a promissory note given for tuition to plaintiff's cor-
respondence school. Defendant filed a cross petition seeking dam-
ages for mental suffering and harassment caused by: (1) threaten-
ing letters sent by plaintiff to defendant in an attempt to collect
the debt, (2) letters sent to defendant's employer, and (3) letters
sent to defendant's neighbors. Many of the letters sent to plaintiff
contained accusations of dishonesty and moral turpitude. The let-
ters to defendant's employer threatened garnishment of his wages,
and the letters to his neighbors resulted in their chiding him. The
defendant claimed no physical injuries but sought damages solely
for mental pain, anguish and humiliation, causing nervousness and
insomnia. The supreme court in affirming a judgment of 500 dol-
lars for the defendant stated the rule to be:
"In cases of wilful and wanton wrongs and those committed with
malice and an intention to cause mental distress, damages are, as a
general rule, recoverable for mental suffering even without bodily
injury, and though no pecuniary damage is alleged or proved."
The distinction seems to be in all of the cases as between an
act or series of-acts done wilfully and purposely-or maliciously and
acts which are merely the result of negligence. 58
The rule enunciated in the LaSalle case is based solely on the in-
tent of the defendant.59 The severity of distress was not material,
although this is usually a major factor in intentional infliction of
56 Id. at 556, 145 N.W. at 1002.
57 126 Neb. 457, 253 N.W. 424 (1934).
58 Id. at 462, 253 N.W. at 426.
59 "The intent is the essence of the tort." Dickler, supra note 40 at 438.
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mental distress cases.60 The interest protected in the LaSalle case
was mental seclusion and comes close to adoption of an unex-
pressed right to privacy at least in the intrusion area.61
B. DISCLOSURE
The prevention of public disclosure of private facts is designed
to protect the interests of personal dignity, self-respect, and privacy
of name, likeness, or history. 62 The facts disclosed must be en-
titled to privacy and publicity to third parties must be shown.
The disclosure must also be such that it would be offensive and
objectionable to a reasonable man. Truth is not a defense to this
action nor need there be a showing of advantage or benefit on the
part of the defendant.63 An exception has developed in that pub-
lic figures in certain situations are deemed to have waived their
right to privacy. 64 There is also an exception for publication of
material of a "public interest" which has been the major defense
for newspapers in suits based on the right to privacy.65 Perhaps
the leading case in this area involved the production of a movie
which told the life story of the plaintiff who had once been a
prostitute but who for the past eight years had been reformed and
led a normal life. The picture subjected the plaintiff to severe
humiliation and distress.66 Creditors have also been responsible
60 Most courts speak of "severe" emotional distress. State Rubbish Col-
lectors Ass'n v. Siliznoff, 38 Cal. 2d 330, 240 P.2d 282 (1952). See also
PROSSER, TORTS § 11 at 47-52 (3d ed. 1964); 1 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS
§ 9.1 (1956).
61 For a case based on the right to privacy with almost identical facts as
the LaSalle case, see Housh v. Peth, 165 Ohio St. 35, 133 N.E.2d 340
(1956).
62 See 1 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS § 9.6 (1956). It is sometimes very diffi-
cult to place a given case into any one of the four categories because
many cases involve more than one of these torts. The distinction be-
tween appropriation and disclosure is superficial in some cases. It may
be the difference between plaintiff's picture or history being printed
in a news story vs. an advertisement. Dickler drew the distinctions
as follows: "In the cases relating to 'disclosures', the profit motive is
often wanting, and, when present, does not dominate the defendant's
acts; in the 'appropriations' group, it 'sicklies o'er' the entire scene."
Dickler, supra note 40 at 440.
63 PROSSER, TORTS § 112 at 834-37 (3d ed. 1964).
64 Three reasons are given for this exception: (1) consent, (2) waiver of
the right, and (3) press' right to inform the public of a legitimate
public interest. Id. at 845.
65 E.g., Bremmer v. Journal-Tribune Publishing Co., 247 Iowa 817, 76
N.W.2d 762 (1956) (publication of picture of the decomposed body of
plaintiff's son held newsworthy).
66 Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 Pac. 91 (Dist. Ct. App. 1931).
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for numerous cases in this area. Publication either to the debtor's
friends, his employer, or to the public in general of the debt owed
has been a fruitful source of litigation.6 7 Also the publishing of
photographs without the subject's permission is a disclosure as
well as an intrusion.68 If the picture was taken with permission
but published without it, the tort would be that of disclosure
only.69, The justification for recognition of this branch of the tort
of right to privacy can be found also in the ever increasing amount
of investigations into private lives.70
The disclosure area is closely related to defamation, the major
distinction being that in defamation truth is usually a defense.
7 1
In Nebraska, however, truth alone is not a defense to a libel or
slander suit, for the defendant must also, show that he acted with
good motives and for justifiable ends. 2  Thus, in Nebraska the
public disclosure of private facts may be actionable under the
label of defamation without the necessity of adopting the "right
to privacy" nomenclature.
In Wertz v. Sprecher,73 the defendant published in his news-
paper that the plaintiff while acting as county attorney, also rep-
resented a client in defending a claim by the county. The Ne-
braska Supreme Court held that the publication- was libelous per
67 Brents v. Morgan, 221 Ky. 765, 299 S.W. 67 (1927) (debt advertised in
show-window); Housh v. Peth, 165 Ohio St. 35, 133 N.E.2d 340 (1956)
(debtor's landlord told of debt).
68 See authorities cited note 48 supra.
60 See Douglas v. Stokes, 149 Ky. 506, 149 S.W. 849 (1912), where defend-
ant had permission to photograph plaintiff's dead siamese twins but
published the photographs without permission. See also, Myers v.
United States Camera Publishing Corp., 9 Misc. 2d 765, 167 N.Y.S.2d
771 (N.Y. City Ct. 1957) (published full body photograph of nude
woman without written consent). . .
70 Vance Packard estimates that the "nation's 2000-odd credit bureaus
send one another more than 4,000,000 reports on individuals every
year." Packard also reports that the Credit Bureau of Greater New
York adds 1,000,000 "derogatory" reports to its files each year. PAcKARD,
THE NAKED SocIETY, 168-69 (1964). It takes little imagination and only
a reasonably efficient memory to recall how.much private information
could be accumulated from an individual through forms, which are
required to be filled out for various reasoiis. See generally, PAcKARD,
THE NAKED SociETY (1964).
71 Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383 (1960); Wade, Defamation and
the Right of Privacy, 15 VAW. L. REv. -1093, 1110 (1962). Professor
Wade lists other distinctions between the two torts which will be dis-
cussed under the tort of false light where the elements of similarity
are more striking.
72 NEB. CoNsT. Art. 1, § 5.
73 82 Neb. 834, 118 N.W. 1071 (1908).
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se and that truth alone without good motives was not a defense.
The court justified its holding in the following language:
It is a further fact that individuals guilty of improprieties, indis-
cretions, or crimes, it may be, can, by subsequent observance of
the laws of man and of God, win for themselves the respect and
confidence of their associates and of the community. It is repug-
nant to the crudest ideas of justice to say that, under such circum-
stances, the truth of a recital of past history ought to entitle a
defendant to a verdict in a civil action. If the truth of the article
is alleged, it should be received in mitigation of damages without
regard to the motives of defendant or the end sought by the publi-
cation, but the truth alone ought not to be an absolute bar to re-
covery.74
In this way the court recognized the interest sought to be protected
by the tort of disclosure and the court's duty to protect it. If the
Wertz case does not establish the disclosure doctrine as such, it
certainly provides a stable foundation for acceptance and develop-
ment of the doctrine today. Earlier Nebraska cases provide for the
"public interest" exception7 5 as well as the "celebrity" exception 76
to the general rule preventing disclosure. Further support for this
branch of the right to privacy outside the defamation cases may be
found in LaSalle Extension Univ. v. Fogarty,7 7 where one of the
acts complained of was the sending of letters to the defendant's
neighbors, an act falling clearly within the disclosure doctrine.
C. FALSE LIGHT
The third aspect of the tort protects the plaintiff from being
put in a false light in the public eye. Here again the sanctity of
name and identity are reaffirmed. The publication of facts need
not be defamatory, but they must be false and objectionable to a
reasonable man. No invasion of privacy is required.78  The only
74 Id. at 838, 118 N.W. at 1072. (Emphasis added.)
75 Citizens of a town circulated petition asking plaintiff to leave within
ten days because of his whore house operation. The court held that
the public interest provided the good motives necessary for the defense.
Deupree v. Thornton, 98 Neb. 804, 154 N.W. 557 (1915).
76 Defendant published article concerning plaintiff's trip to London, the
death of his wife, and the subsequent secret marriage to a friend.
Plaintiff was a bishop and internationally known churchman and social
welfare leader. The federal court held that his prominence subjected
him to the limelight and that he "must expect his words and personal
acts to be freely published." Cannon v. Bee News Publishing Co., 8
F. Supp. 154 (D. Neb. 1933).
77 126 Neb. 457, 253 N.W. 424 (1934). The facts of this case are examined
with relation to the tort of intrusion. See text accompanying note 57
supra.
78 PROSSER, TORTS § 112 at 837-39 (3d ed. 1964).
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difference between the false light doctrine and that of disclosure
is that the former deals with false statements, the latter with true
statements. 79 Both bear a close resemblance to defamation. Wheth-
er false light is in reality, though not in name, accepted in Nebraska
will be determined by the distinctions between the two torts, the
importance of the distinctions, and the extent of protection given
by the Nebraska law of defamation.
Confusion in right to privacy cases resulting from amalgama-
tion of all four torts under the same terminology has caused a like
confusion in contrasting defamation and false light. The most
often cited difference is that truth is not a defense to a right to
privacy action.8 0 In fact, truth alone is a defense by definition to
an action predicated on the false light doctrine. Professor Wade
in the leading comparison of defamation and privacy8l lists several
other distinctions between the two torts without recognizing dis-
closure and false light as separate torts. According to Wade,
defamation draws the distinction between oral and written state-
ments which is not drawn in privacy cases.82 The right of privacy
is not burdened with the distinction between slander per se and
slander with special damages, the rules of technical malice, or the
rules of pleading requiring innuendos. The basis for a defamation
action is the effect on other persons whereas the basis of a privacy
action is the effect on the plaintiff himself.8 3 Wade also noted sev-
eral similarities. Both actions require publication and both are in-
79 One good example of the false light doctrine is where the plaintiff's
finger prints and photograph are kept in the "Rogues' Gallary" even
after he is acquitted. State ex rel. Mavity v. Tyndall, 224 Ind. 364, 66
N.E.2d 755 (1946). See also, Brink v. Griffith, 65 Wash. 2d 253, 396
P.2d 793 (1964) where defendant as mayor of the town placed the
plaintiff, a municipal police officer, in a false light in order to explain
his discharge. The Washington Supreme Court avoided the privacy
issue.
80 See Yankwich, The Right of Privacy: Its Development, Scope and Lim-
itations, 27 NoTmR DAvmE LAw. 499, 520 (1952); Wade, supra note 71 at
1109. See also, Brunson v. Ranks Army Store, 161 Neb. 519, 525, 73
N.W.2d 803, 806 (1955) where the Nebraska court gives as one of its
reasons for rejecting privacy the fact that "not even the truth of the
allegations is a defense."
81 Wade, supra note 71 at 1109-25.
82 Although recent privacy cases have not drawn any distinction between
oral and written statements, Warren and Brandeis stated in their article
"the law would probably not grant any redress for the invasion of pri-
vacy by oral publication in the absence of special damages." Warren
& Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. Rnv. 193, 217 (1890).
There has been some judicial authority limiting actions to written
publications. See Pangallo v. Murphy, 243 S.W.2d 496 (Kyr. 1951).
83 See also, Yankwich, supra note 80 at 506.
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tentional torts, although defamation has developed a strict lia-
bility area which may or may not apply to privacy actions, and
the measure of damages for both are identical.8 4 Other than tech-
nical requirements there is little difference in substance or in the
interest protected. However, Prosser contends that the false light
doctrine is considerably broader and may provide a "needed remedy
in a good many instances not covered by the other tort."8 5 The
line between protection of reputation and protection of feelings is
a fine one. This difference was recognized in a recent Washington
decision but the court noted:
A problem arises, however, from the fact that for either defama-
tion or invasion of privacy the damages recoverable are not limited
to the theoretical bases of the respective torts. In defamation ac-
tions, the injured party is allowed to recover for emotional distress
as well as injury to reputation, and vice versa in some actions for in-
vasion of privacy.8 6
The Nebraska test for libelous per se is whether the language im-
putes to the plaintiff a commission of a crime, or subjects him to
ridicule, ignominy, or disgrace.8 7 Since injury is presumed and ac-
tual damage to the reputation need not be shown in a libel per se
situation,88 the torts of false light and libel per se appear identi-
cal. 9 Regardless of the phraseology the interest protected is a
mental interest and whether the cause (damage to reputation) or
the effect (mental distress) is the basis of the language, either
rule will protect the interest. It is true that the false light doctrine
is potentially broader but its expansion will depend on where the
courts draw the line as to what would offend an ordinary man.
It cannot be said that the idea behind the false light doctrine is
completely foreign to Nebraska common law and precedent did
not justify a total repudiation of the doctrine. The Nebraska court
recognized the importance of the interest protected by this doc-
trine by quoting from Othello, Act III, Scene 3:
Who steals my purse, steals trash; 'tis something,
nothing.
'Twas mine, 'tis his, and has been slave to thousands;
84 Wade, supra note 71 at 1110-11.
85 PROSSER, TORTS § 112 at 839 (3d ed. 1964).
86 Brink v. Griffith, 65 Wash. 2d 253, 258, 396 P.2d 793, 796-97 (1964).
87 Heckes v. Fremont Newspapers, Inc., 144 Neb. 267, 13 N.W.2d 110 (1944).
88 Sheibley v. Nelson, 84 Neb. 393, 121 N.W. 458 (1909).
s9 "Despite the different way of stating the two tests, in the case of a false
statement they seem quite likely to reach the same result. Certainly
it would appear that a statement which holds him [plaintiff] up to
hatred, ridicule, or contempt would offend the sensibilities of an ordi-
nary, reasonable person." Wade, supra note 71 at 1111.
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But he that filches from me my good name,
Robs me of that which not enriches him,
And makes me poor indeed.90
The precedents of Nebraska do not show conclusively that the
doctrine of false light has been accepted in Nebraska under another
label, but the cases on defamation allow a foundation upon which
to build ample protection for the mental interest involved without
"judicial legislation." In certain respects Nebraska defamation law
may be even broader than the false light doctrine since truth alone
is a defense to the latter whereas good motives must also be shown
in the former.
D. APPROPRIATION
[T]he effect of the appropriation decisions is to recognize or create
an exclusive right in the individual plaintiff to a species of trade
name, his own, and a kind of trade mark in his likeness.9 '
The essence of the tort is the appropriation of the plaintiff's name,
likeness, personality or history for the advantage of the defend-
ant.9 2 There need be no showing of an intrusion but publicity is
necessary.93 A study of the history of the tort of appropriation
demonstrates that Nebraska has expressly recognized this aspect
of the right to privacy as a part of the common law, although no
direct holding has been found.
In 1888 the English Chancery Division in Pollard v. Photo-
graphic Co.,94 granted an injunction restraining the defendant
90 Pokrok Zapadu Publishing Co. v. Zizkovsky, 42 Neb. 64, 80, 60 N.W.
358, 362 (1894).
91 PROSSER, TORTS § 112 at 842 (3d ed. 1964). The appropriation doctrine
has also been the basis for creation of a new tort, "the right to public-
ity." Haelan Laboratories v. Topps Chewing Gum, 202 F.2d 866 (2d
Cir. 1953) cert. denied 346 U.S. 816 (1954). See also, Nimmer, The
Right of Publicity, 19 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 203 (1954). However
there seems to be no distinction between appropriation and right to
publicity.
92 Examples of the tort of appropriation may not give rise to the degree
of outrage that the other torts do but nevertheless the growth of mass
communications and "testimonial" advertising require protection for
the unwilling testifier, See Fairfield v. American Photocopy Equip.
Co., 138 Cal. App. 2d 82, 291 P.2d 194 (Dist. Ct. App. 1955) where defend-
ant, a manufacturer of photocopying machines, circulated among mem-
bers of the legal profession a circular indicating that plaintiff, an attor-
ney, was a satisfied user. In fact, he had returned a machine as unsatis-
factory. See also, Korn v. Rennison, 21 Conn. Supp. 400, 156 A.2d 476
(Super. Ct. 1959) (minor girl's picture used for advertisement without
her consent.)
93 PRossma, TORTS § 112 at 839-44 (3d ed. 1964).
94 40 Ch. Div. 345 (1888).
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from exhibiting Christmas cards displaying the plaintiff's photo-
graph which was taken by request but subsequently used by the
defendant without plaintiff's permission. The court said:
The question, therefore, is whether a photographer who has been
employed by a customer to take his or her photograph for his own
use, and selling and disposing of them, or publically exhibiting
them by way of advertisement or otherwise, without the authority
of such customer, either express or implied .... To the question
thus put, my answer is in the negative, that a photographer is notjustified in so doing. 95
The court then based its reasoning on the breach of an implied
contract not to use the photograph and on a property concept.
In 1890 Warren and Brandeis wrote their famous article and
commenting on the Pollard case said:
This process of implying a term in a contract ... is nothing more
nor less than a judicial declaration that public morality, private
justice, and general convenience demand the recognition of such a
rule, and that the publication under similar circumstances would
be considered an intolerable abuse.96
The authors then expanded upon the case, stating that as long as
there were facts to which a contract could be implied courts
would continue to rest their decisions on such grounds but actually
this was all a part of the underlying concept of right to privacy.
The first attempt to establish the right to privacy in the United
States occurred in New York in 1902. In Roberson v. Rochester
Folding Box Co.,97 the defendant took the plaintiff's photograph
and then without her consent used it on sacks of flour which he
sold. The plaintiff sued for damages for mental distress. On facts
almost identical with that of the Pollard case, the Court of Ap-
peals of New York distinguished the cases because of the implied
contract in the English decision and expressly rejected Warren and
Brandeis' article on the grounds that the right to privacy did not
exist at common law.
Three years later in 1905 the Georgia Supreme Court on facts
identical to both Pollard and Roberson, accepted the doctrine of
right to privacy as a distinct right susceptible to protection at com-
mon law.98 Thus as of 1905, two lines of authority were available
on whether the right to privacy was in fact a common law right.
95 Id. at 349.
96 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 82 at 210.
97 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442 (1902).
98 Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905).
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On December 20, 1905, an action was filed in the Nebraska Su-
preme Court by the State of Nebraska against the State Journal
Company, asking damages for breach of contract 9 The defend-
ant was under contract with the state to publish the Supreme
Court Reports, which were in turn sold to the public by the state.
The defendant made extra copies and sold them for his own
profit. The court in sustaining defendant's demurrer held that
once a work is published the author's rights in that work can be
protected only by the copyright laws and not at common law.
One year later in 1906 the Supreme Court ruled on a motion
for rehearing on behalf of the state.100 That motion was based on
the proposition that when one employs another to manufacture
pictures or books for him the person has no right to make any
other copies for his own benefit. For the proposition the state cited
the Pollard decision. The Nebraska Supreme Court distinguished
the Pollard case because the Supreme Court Reports were public
documents which had already been published and could thus be
protected only by the copyright laws. Commenting on Pollard
the Nebraska court said the right to privacy "was so well estab-
lished in English law that it was unnecessary to discuss that
right."'u0 Thus, the Nebraska Supreme Court expressly recog-
nized the right to privacy as a common law doctrine. It adopted
the Pavesich rather than the Roberson line of decisions. In fact,
Nebraska is in all likelihood one of the first states to do so.
In the Brunson case the court cited four cases for the proposi-
tion that the right to privacy is not recognized at common law.10 2
All of these are based on the foundation of the Roberson decision.
No mention of the State Journal decision can be found either in
the opinion or the briefs of the Brunson case.
V. BRUNSON V. RANKS ARMY STORE
It is appropriate now to examine the Brunson'0 3 case in light
of the four-prong analysis of the right to privacy. There is some
question as to whether the facts of the case fall within any of the
four categories.
99 State v. State Journal Co., 75 Neb. 275, 106 N.W. 434 (1905).
100 State v. State Journal Co., 77 Neb. 752, 110 N.W. 763 (1906).
101 Id. at 758, 110 N.W. at 765-66. For full quotation see text accompany-
ing note 12, supra.
102 Brunson v. Ranks Army Store, 161 Neb. 519, 73 N.W.2d 803 (1955).
103 Ibid.
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A. FACTS OF THE BRUNSON CASE
The defendant, who operated a general department store, hired
the plaintiff, an actor, to lead other employees of the defendant in
a portrayal of the famous Brinks robbery, as an advertising gim-
mick for defendant's business. Plaintiff agreed on the express un-
derstanding that defendant would notify and obtain permission
from the Omaha Police Department. As a result of defendant's fail-
ure to inform the police, plaintiff and other "robbers" were ar-
rested, held for about an hour, and then released on bond. News-
papers picked up the story, and it received nation-wide news cov-
erage. Subsequently defendant, without plaintiff's permission, ran
an advertisement in the local newspaper as follows: "Jim Brunson,
professional stunt man of 38 years, put on such a sensational
stunt that the whole crew were thrown in the clink." That
afternoon a second advertisement was circulated which read:
"Ranks Gang Captured. The public can sigh in relief now because
the Ranks gang led by Omaha's leading desperado, Jim Brunson,
was captured Saturday." Plaintiff alleged that the episode with
the police and subsequent publicity caused him abuse, ridicule, and
damage to his reputation and standing in the community. His
claim was an invasion of his right to privacy.
B. APPLICATION OF THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY
There are serious questions whether the plaintiff in the Brun-
son case could have recovered in a jurisdiction recognizing all four
categories of privacy protection. No intrusion can be found, since
the plaintiff voluntarily assumed the role he portrayed. There
was also no disclosure of private facts. The doctrine of false light
seems to hold the best chance of recovery if the effect of the news
coverage and subsequent advertisements made no reference to the
theatrical aspect of the plaintiff's activities, but merely reported
those activities as though they were an actual robbery attempt.
The court gives no indication as to which was the case. It could
also be argued that the plaintiff became a "public figure" and
thus should have expected and could have been deemed to have
consented to the publicity. The tort of appropriation also does not
conclusively establish a cause of action. Plaintiff sold his acting
talents for the benefit of defendant's business, and this was how
they were used. It is possible that the Nebraska court in Brun-
son did not have a right to privacy case at all.
VI. CONCLUSION
Where recognized as a child of the common law, the right to
privacy with all of its facets is and should remain a flexible con-
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cept. It was devised as a result of the increasing pressures which
society places on the individual, and it may need to grow in breadth
as those pressures continue to increase. Any right or interest
which may potentially be threatened by technological advance-
ment or the fertile imagination of man must be protected by
laws easily adaptible to situations at present incapable of compre-
hension.10 4  Such is the common law. The Nebraska Supreme
Court in Brunson placed the duty of enforcing these rights on the
legislature. In Myers, the court has seemed to reassume this duty
for itself. If the court refuses to review the Brunson case in
light of precedent or is not soon asked to review that decision the
legislature should act. But, in this area, judicial action is to be
preferred,10 5 and it would seem that the way is still open for such
action in Nebraska.
104 "Only those who have felt the whip of invasion know the effect of its
sting, but let others beware lest the whip find its mark in places
hitherto considered beyond the bounds of imagination." ZLE mwER,
INVASIONS OF PrVACY 40 (1959).
105 "Whenever the right of privacy has been legislated into existence its
development has been restricted by the rigidity of the statute. In those
states which have worked the right of privacy into the fabric of their
common law, however, it has grown and altered to fit the changing
conditions of modern times." Nizer, The Right of Privacy, 39 MICH. L.
REv. 526, 539 (1941).
